WHAT THE INSTRUMENT DOES
EXHIBIT 13
WHAT AN ALARM IS WORTH
A 95% accurate detector can be wrong almost every time it fires.
Every exhibit before this one asked whether a hidden channel can be detected. This one asks the question that decides whether detection is useful: when the detector alarms, how often is it right?
ARITHMETIC / NO QR ENCODING / APPLIES TO EVERY DETECTOR ABOVE
THE SEARCH POPULATION
Ten thousand symbols
Set how often hiding actually occurs, and how good the instrument is. The grid below is one dot per symbol.
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WHAT THE POPULATION DOES
WHAT AN ANALYST SHOULD REPORT
THE FOUR QUESTIONS
Ask four questions of a number, not a symbol.
WHAT THE SCANNER SEES
WHAT CHANGED UNDERNEATH
WHAT A SECOND READER CAN RECOVER
HOW AN ANALYST CAN NOTICE
FINDING
Accuracy is a property of the instrument. Meaning is a property of the population.
Steganography is rare in ordinary traffic. When the thing you are looking for is rare, almost everything that alarms is a member of the large clean majority rather than the small hidden minority — even for an instrument that is right 95% of the time in both directions. Raising sensitivity barely moves this. Raising specificity moves it a great deal, because specificity is multiplied by the far larger number.
A detector that never fires on clean symbols is worth more than one that never misses a hidden one.
This is why every detection exhibit on this site reports what it cannot separate, and why regeneration-and-compare spends a full scenario on an innocent encoder mismatch. A false-positive condition is not a footnote to a detection method. At realistic prevalence it is the dominant term.
Basis: the arithmetic here is Bayes' rule and can be checked by hand from the grid. For why it matters specifically to steganalysis, see Andrew D. Ker et al., “Moving Steganography and Steganalysis from the Laboratory into the Real World,” IH&MMSec 2013, doi:10.1145/2482513.2482965 2ND — cited here as motivation, not independently re-verified.
Read the research note