In Schnorr, the verifier sends a random challenge c. In Fiat-Shamir, we remove that verifier message and derive c by hashing public transcript data. This turns an interactive proof into a single self-contained proof object.
That "hash as verifier" pattern is the bridge from educational Sigma protocols toward many modern signature and proof systems used in production.
Here the SHA-256 digest is reduced to only 50 challenges. Different messages can therefore produce the same challenge, and a tampered message can still verify. The result, log and narration report the computed equation and both challenges; passing this toy check does not establish secure message binding. RFC 8235 §2.3 describes cryptographic-sized hash challenges and contextual binding for Schnorr NIZK; this exhibit is a small pedagogical model, not a conforming production implementation.
| Dimension | This Exhibit | Production Expectation |
|---|---|---|
| Hash input | R || y || message | Domain separated transcript with context binding |
| Challenge range | 1..50 | Large scalar field challenge |
| Math domain | Small prime modulus | Secure elliptic curves or large finite fields |
| Security model | Didactic random-oracle intuition | Audited proofs and protocol-specific assumptions |